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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MARCY G. MYERS, I 
Plaintiff-Petitioner, 
Court of Appeals No. 860279 
V. 
Lower Court No. C 82 5014 
DARLENE STOUT (COPPLE)f 
Category 13 
Defendant-Respondent. | 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
Petitioner herewith petitions the Supreme Court 
of Utah for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals 
of the State of Utah to review the unpublished decision 
of the Court of Appeals filed in the above matter. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court's finding that "[d]uring 
the summer of 1978 Mrs. Stout discussed the sale of the home 
with Mr. and Mrs. Smith, and both agreed it would be sold to 
Mrs. Stout.", is sufficient to support a judgment quieting 
title to the home in defendant where 1) title to the home was 
in Mr. and Mrs. Smith jointly, at the time 2) Mr. Smith and 
Mrs. Stout entered into a uniform contract whereby Mr. Smith 
agreed to sell, and Mrs. Stout agreed to buy the home, and 
(3) Mrs. Stout claims the interest of Mrs. Smith under an oral 
contract partly performed. 
2. Whether the trial courtfs findings that "Mrs. Stout 
made the down payment and the initial monthly payments of 
$788.00 to Alvin Smith. Thereafter checks were made payable 
to Al and Sandra Smith which Sandra Smith endorsed and 
deposited in a joint bank account. Thereafter Mrs. Stout 
made payments directly to Tracy Mortgage on the loan for 
the property. Said loan was in the names of Sandra and Al 
Smith.", support the trial court's conclusion of part 
performance, and the judgment quieting title in defendant, 
where the terms of the oral contract are not shown in the 
record or found by the trial court, and such payments were 
made pursuant to and were required by the written uniform 
contract executed by Mrs. Stout and Mr. Smith. 
3. Whether the trial court1s findings that "Mrs. Smith 
acquiesced in the sale and agreed to the sale by showing Mrs. 
Stout through the home and discussing the purchase price of 
$97,500.00.", and "[t]hereafter checks were made payable to Al 
and Sandra Smith which Sandra Smith endorsed and deposited 
in a joint bank account.", support the conclusions of law that 
there was an enforceable oral agreement and the checks 
satisfied the statute of frauds, and whether said findings 
and conclusions support the judgment. 
4. Whether the trial courtfs findings that "Sandra Smith 
orally agreed to the sale and acquiesced in the sale to Stout 
and knew the sale was for the entire parcel of property." 
"td]uring the summer of 1978 Mrs. Stout discussed the 
sale of the home with Mr. and Mrs. Smith, and both agreed 
it would be sold to Mrs. Stout.", "Mrs. Smith acquiesced 
in the sale and agreed to the sale by showing Mrs. Stout 
through the home and discussing the purchase price of 
$97r500.00.", and ". . .checks were made payable to Al and 
Sandra Smith which Sandra Smith endorsed and deposited in 
a joint bank account.", support the trial court's conclusion 
of ratification by Mrs. Smith of the uniform real estate 
contract between Al Smith and Mrs. Stout, and the trial 
court's judgment quieting title. 
5. Whether the claim of "oral contract" asserted in 
defense of a partition proceeding is subject to the statute 
of limitations. 
COURT OF APPEALS OPINION 
The decision of which review is requested is unpublished. 
It is re-printed and included in the addendum hereto. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
A. Date of entry of decision sought to be reviewed: 
November 9, 1988; 
B. Date of order respecting a rehearing: December 21, 
1988. 
C. Statutory provision conferring jurisdiction on the 
Supreme Court to review the decision by a writ of certiorari: 
Utah Code Anno: § 78-2-2(5), 1988. 
CONTROLLING STATUTES 
Statute of frauds, §§ 25-5-1, 3, and 8, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
§25-5-1. Estate or interest in real property. No 
estate or interest in real property . . . shall be created 
granted, assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise than 
. . .by deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by the 
party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or 
declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto 
authorized by writing. 
§25-5-3. Leases and contracts for interest in lands. 
Every contract for the . . .sale. . .of any lands, or any 
interest in lands, shall be void unless the contract, or 
some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed 
by the party by whom the . . . sale is to be made, or 
by his lawful agent thereunto authorized in writing. 
§25-5-8. Right to specific performance not affected. 
Nothing in this chapter contained shall be construed to 
abridge the powers of courts to compel the specific performance 
of agreements in case of part performance thereof. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Petitioner's predecessor in interest brought partition 
proceedings in the lower court. Defendant-respondent filed her 
amended answer in which no counterclaim was included. Oral 
contract, estoppel, and ratification were among the defenses 
pleaded in the amended answer. The lower court rendered judgment 
in defendant's favor which quieted the title to the entire 
property in defendant. The judgment gives no indication what 
interest in the real property was confirmed or extinguished. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed and denied rehearing. 
The property consists of a home on a single lot which, 
prior to July 21, 1978, belonged to Alvin R. Smith and Sandra 
Smith, husband and wife, as joint tenants (Tr. Vol III pp. 
6-7, 14-15, 22; Exhibit 16-P). On April 26, 1976 they 
jointly executed a trust deed to Tracy Collins Bank which 
required installment payments. The trust deed was current 
at the time of trial. (Tr. Vol. VII pp. 10-13; Exhibits 
24-D and 25-D). On July 21, 1978 "Al Smith Const. Co. by 
Alvin R. Smith" executed a uniform contract for the sale of 
the property to defendant-respondent (Tr. Vol. II pp. 3-4; 
Tr. Vol. VII p. 90; Tr. Vol. IX p. 5; Exhibits 1-D, 12-P). 
Payments of $25000, $500, and $5000 were made by defendant 
to Alvin R. Smith (Tr. Vol II pp. 59-61). The payment for 
August 1, 1978, and those made thereafter until April 20, 1979 
were made to Alvin R. Smith (Tr. Vol. VII pp. 43-45). 
The check issued for an April 20, 1979 payment was 
made to "Alvin and Sandra Smith" and was endorsed by both. 
The check was for "Mortgage payment to date for 4120 
Donibristle Road." (Tr. Vol. VII pp. 41-43, 45; Exhibit 
4-D). On April 18, 1979 defendant recorded a Notice of 
Interest in which she declared her interest in the property 
to be "evidenced by a certain Uniform Real Estate Contract 
dated July 21, 1978, by and between Al Smith Construction 
Company as Seller, and the undersigned Darlene Stout as 
buyer." (Exhibit 18-P) 
Defendant's check for a May 8, 1979 payment was issued 
to "Alvin and Sandra Smith." The check was endorsed by Sandra 
for both payees. (Tr. Vol VII p. 47; Exhibit 38-D). 
The June 5, 1979 check was to "Sandra & Alvin Smith 
Const." Sandra provided the only endorsement. The check 
was noted as payment for "Mortgage to Date on Above 
Address [4120 Donibristle Road, South Jordan, Utah 84065]." 
(Tr. Vol. VII p. 46; Exhibit 37-D). 
The check for the July 5, 1979 payment was to 
"Al and Sandra Smith," with notation "Mortgage to Date." 
It was endorsed only by Sandra. (Tr. Vol. VII p. 47; 
Exhibit 39-D). 
The check for the September 5, 1979 payment was to 
"Al & Sandra Smith" and was noted for payment of "Contract 
to Date House above [Jack or Darlene Stout 4120 Donibristle 
Road, South Jordan, Utah 84065]." It too was endorsed by 
Sandra only. (Tr. Vol. VII p.48; Exhibit 41-D). 
The check for October 1, 1979 was payable to "Al & 
Sandra Smith," with notation "Paid to Contract to Date 
4120 Donibristle," and was endorsed "Al & Sandra Smith" by 
Sandra only. (Tr. Vol. VII pp. 47-48; Exhibit 40-D). 
The November 7, 1979 check was payable to "Al & 
Sandra Smith" with notation "Paid to Contract," and was 
endorsed by Sandra Smith "For Deposit Only Al & Sandra 
Smith." (Tr. Vol. VII pp. 48-50; Exhibit 42-D). 
The December 5, 1979 check was to "Al & Sandra Smith," 
with notation "Contract to Date," and was endorsed by Sandra 
Smith as follows: "Al & Sandra Smith." (Tr. Vol. VII pp. 50-
51; Exhibit 43-D). The January 1, 1980 check was to "Al & 
Sandra Smith" with notation "Contract to Date," and was 
endorsed by Sandra "Al and Sandra Smith By Sandra H. Smith." 
(Tr. Vol. VII p. 49; Exhibit 44-D). 
The checks payable to Al and Sandra Smith were for 
$788.00 which is the amount of the monthly payments due on 
the Al Smith/Mrs. Stout uniform contract. For the remainder 
of 1980, and thereafter, defendant made the mortgage payments 
directly to the mortgagee. (Tr. Vol. VII pp. 55-59; Exhibit 
7-D) . 
When asked "Isn't it true that you started putting 
Sandra Smith's name on the checks because you had been told 
by somone that she hadn't signed the contract and you needed 
to do that to involve her?", defendant answered, "No, Sandra 
told me to put her name on the checks . . . [s]o that she 
[Sandra Smith] could take care of her business. She said she 
had to run them through her books." (Tr. Vol. VII p. 72-73). 
On December 31, 1980 Sandra conveyed her interest in 
the property to a Utah corporation. The deed was dated and 
recorded that day. (Tr. Vol. Ill p. 18; Exhibit 19-P). 
Defendant Stout did not request Sandra Smith to 
execute the July 21, 1978 uniform contract at any time before 
or at the time of its execution (Tr. Vol. II p. 20); and 
Sandra did not comply with defendant's requests made thereafter 
to sign the uniform contract. (Tr. Vol. II pp. 17-21; Tr. Vol. 
VII pp. 59, 95-96) . 
In January, 1982 Alvin R. Smith d/b/a Al Smith 
Construction Company, by warranty deed delivered to and 
accepted by defendant, conveyed a one-half undivided interest 
in the property to defendant Stout. The deed was recorded 
by defendant on September 9, 1983. (Tr. Vol. II pp. 55-56; 
Exhibit 11-D). 
There is no testimony in the record that tends to 
establish an oral contract partly performed for the sale 
by Sandra of her one-half undivided interest in the property 
to defendant. Defendant's case in that regard cannot be any 
stronger than the evidence she introduces in support of the 
claim. The sum total of that evidence is the defendant1s, 
and the defendant's daughter's testimony as to what was stated 
by Sandra in the course of their alleged dealings. Defendant 
testified Sandra said "And since [defendant's] husband worked 
for Al [Smith] as an agent, that she [Sandra] was delighted 
that . . .we would move in there if we did . . . " (Lines 21-
23, Tr. Vol. II p. 16). "They'd [Al and Sandra Smith] let the 
pool table go with the house. . ." (Lines 22-23, Tr. Vol. 
VII p. 28). "She [Sandra] said that the purchase price at 
that time was ninety-seven five. . . .[and] she was desparate 
to sell it." (Lines 8-11, Tr. Vol. VII p. 29). Defendant 
responded that she, defendant ". . .liked [Sandra's] home 
and that in the event my [defendant's] home sold that I 
would be interested." (Lines 16-19, Tr. Vol. VII p. 29). 
According to defendant, Sandra then said " . . . well, . . . 
we can work it out." (Lines 20-21, Tr. Vol. VII p. 29). 
"She wanted to sell the house. . . .ninety-seven five was 
the price." (Lines 5-6, 8, Tr. Vol. VII p. 35). "I'm 
[Sandra] very glad that you are buying it because your 
husband works with Jack [Stout] and . . • you're really 
going to love it." (Lines 9-12, Tr. Vol. VII p. 62). 
Deanna Copple, defendant's daughter, testified 
Sandra made statements in her presence that Mshe [Sandra] 
was real anxious to sell the home. . .(Lines 7, 12-13, 
Tr. Vol. VII p. 77)" That "the purchase price was almost 
a hundred thousand." (Line 17, Tr. Vol. VII p. 78). 
And that she never heard her [Sandra] say that she was not 
going to sell her interest in the home to her mother. 
(Lines 16-19, Tr. Vol. VII p. 83). 
To demonstrate that there was no evidence to support 
the trial court's finding of fact which is designated a 
conclusion of law that "Sandra Smith orally agreed to the 
sale. . .", in her opening brief in the Court of Appeals 
petitioner set out ver batim, quoted and marshalled, the evidence 
in the record of oral communications between Sandra Smith and 
defendant from which it is self-evident that no oral agreement 
occurred. The Court of Appeals held "Basically, the trial 
Court found that Stout purchased the entire parcel of real 
property involved in this dispute pursuant to (1) a uniform 
real estate contract with Al Smith and (2) certain oral 
representations and other actions of Sandra Smith" but that 
"Myers has failed to marshall the evidence and demonstrate 
its insufficiency and, therefore, we reject her challenge to 
the trial court's findings of fact. Given these findings, the 
trial court's judgment is correct." 
ARGUMENT 
By way of introduction to this part, the issue 
before the Court of Appeals was whether the judgment was 
supported by the facts; appellant's formulation of the issue 
there was to postulate the judgment as not having support 
in the evidentiary facts as well as the facts as found by 
the trial court if in fact the trial court found on material 
facts. 
The finding that ". . .Mrs. Stout discussed the 
sale of the home with Mr. and Mrs. Smith, and both agreed 
it would be sold to Mrs. Stout" and the statements attributed 
to Sandra Smith that "she was delighted that we would move 
in if we did", "the purchase price at that time was ninety-
seven five and she was desparate to sell it", (and defendant's 
response that she "would be interested"), that "we can work 
it out", "I'm very glad you are buying it because your 
husband works with Jack", to establish an oral arrangement 
does not indicate agreement as to all terms and conditions 
but at best an agreement to reach an agreement in the future 
which is of no effect and imposes no obligation on the parties. 
Zappa v. Basden, 373 S.E.2d 246 (Ga.App.1988). Therefore, 
the finding that "both [Mrs. Stout and Mr. and Mrs. Smith] 
agreed it would be sold to Mrs. Stout", implying an agreement 
to reach an agreement in the future, does not support the 
judgment. (See issue 1., Questions Presented for Review). 
The quiet title judgment does not exhibit any independent 
title, nor any right or interest which the judgment con-
verted to title. If it appeared from the judgment that 
defendant's claim was founded in fact upon an oral contract 
partly performed and the judgment confirmed the same and 
extinguished petitioner's adverse claim, the judgment would 
have connected itself with the title. State, etc. v. 
Santiago, 590 P.2d 335 (Utah 1979). 
"It would be a departure from settled rules to hold 
that an ordinary judgment in an action to determine 
adverse claims to land, obtained by a total stranger 
to the title . . operates to transfer title, or 
constitutes a link in the chain of title, and . . . 
admissible in evidence as such against the true 
owner." Minnesota Debenture Co. v. Johnson, 94 Minn. 
150, 102 NW 102 (1905). 
In the instant case there is no indication in the judgment 
as to how and when defendant acquired an ownership interest 
in Sandra Smith's one-half interest in the property. 
It is not sufficient in order that the judgment be 
supported by the facts that the conclusory finding of oral 
agreement, a conclusion of law in this context, be made 
without more. Clear, definite, and mutually understood 
terms must be found (Christensen v. Christensen, 9 Utah 2d 
102, 339 P.2d 101 [1959], and Holmgren Brothers, Inc. v. 
Ballard, 534 P.2d 611 [Utah 1975] which are based upon clear 
unequivocal and definite testimony, or other evidence of the 
same quality. So it would follow that if the agreement to 
be confirmed by the judgment and petitioner's interest 
extinguished then there must be evidence introduced and 
findings made regarding completed performance of the clear, 
definite and mutually understood terms by the contracting 
party in the absence of which the judgment is not supported 
by the facts and in this instance, by the "facts" as found 
by the trial court, 
ARGUMENT AS TO QUESTION NO, 1 
What has been said before in the argument section of 
this petition is applicable here, 
A judgment is a link in the chain of title only 
where it transfers title or renders valid a particular link 
in the chain of title which without the judgment would be 
defective or invalid. Minnesota Debenture Co., supra. 
Defendant's judgment is therefore without adjudicatory effect. 
In formulating the issues for the trial court defendant's 
counsel stated: 
"She [Sandra Smith] was actually part of the contract 
and orally participated in it, was a part of all of 
it; and that her oral contract was made as of this 
written agreement [uniform real estate contract of 
July 21, 19783." Tr. Vol. Ill p. 8. 
It therefore is not clear from anything in this case whether the 
defendant's claim is based upon an oral agreement partly per-
formed or an oral ratification of the uniform contract. 
In either case, the facts do not support the judgment 
as a matter of law for the reasons following. 
The uniform contract between defendant and Al Smith 
only operates to transfer Al Smith's interest in the property. 
Texas American Bank/Levelland v. Morgan, 733 P.2d 874 (N.M. 
1978); Handy v. Shiells, 2325 Cal.Rptr. 543 (Cal.App. lDist. 
1987). After the contract defendant and Sandra Smith are 
tenants in common. Nelson v. Davisf 592 P.2d 594 (Utah 
1979) and Tracy Collins Trust Co. v. Goeltz, 5 Ut2d 350, 
301 P.2d 1086 (1956). Al Smith could not bind Sandra to 
the contract. Carbine v. Meyer, 126 Cal.2d 386, 272 P.2d 
849 (1954), and there is no husband-wife exception to the 
statute of frauds. Williams v. Singleton, 723 P.2d 421 
(Utah 1986) . Only a written power of attorney will authorize 
one to bind another to a contract for the sale of real 
property. Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149 (Utah 1983). 
In order that defendant have the one-half interest of 
Sandra Smith there must have been either an oral contract 
partly performed or a ratification of the Al Smith-Mrs. Stout 
uniform contract in the absence of a conveyance that would 
satisfy the statute of frauds. 
Defendant's concluson number 2, that Sandra Smith 
orally agreed to the sale and acquiesced in the sale to Stout 
and knew the sale was for the entire parcel of property, 
cannot support a judgment for there can be no oral ratification 
of a contract for the sale of real property (Bradshaw v. Mcbride, 
649 P.2d 74 [Utah 1982]), and our court in Coombs v. Ouzounian, 
465 P.2d 356 (Utah 1970) held acquiescence not to overcome the 
bar of the statute of frauds. 
Finding of fact number 6, Mrs. Smith acquiesced in the 
sale and agreed to the sale by showing Mrs. Stout through 
the home and discussing the purchase price of $97,500.00 
also cannot support the judgment. In Gregerson v. Jensen, 
669 P.2d 396 (Utah 1983), where the wife participated in 
the conversations leading up to the delivery of the check 
"she signed nothing" and in that "she has never signed 
any writing sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds 
obligating her to sell her property to the buyers, there was, 
as the district court held, no basis for a decree of specific 
performance against the sellers." 
ARGUMENT AS TO QUESTION NO. 2 
The trial court1s findings referred to in question 2 
are as to the payments made by defendant under her contract 
with Mr. Smith. In order to constitute "part performance" 
the payments must be exclusively referable to the oral contract 
sought to be enforced. Downtown Athletic Club v. Horman, 
740 P.2d 275 (UtahApp 1987). In that the payments are not 
in any way referable to an oral agreement partly performed 
the findings cannot, in law, support the judgment 
ARGUMENT AS TO QUESTION NO. 3 
The trial court's finding that checks were made payable 
to Al and Sandra Smith which Sandra Smith endorsed and deposited 
in a joint bank account and conclusion that the checks made 
to Sandra Smith constitute writings referable to her agreement 
satisfying the Statute of Frauds also do not support the judgment 
for the reason the checks are not exclusively referable to 
"her agreement", Downtown Athletic Club, supra, and in order 
that a written agreement of memorandum which is relied upon 
to satisfy the statute of frauds must contain all the essential 
terms and provisions of the agreement of the parties; every 
official element of the contract must be expressed in writing. 
Zappa v. Basden, 373 S.E.2d 246 (Ga.App. 1988); Birdzell v. 
Utah Oil Refining Co., 121 Utah 412, 242 P.2d 578 (1952). 
And of perhaps greater importance is the undisputed fact 
that neither Mrs. Stout nor Sandra Smith intended Sandra 
Smith's endorsement to "involve her" with the contract. 
(Tr. Vol. VII p. 72-73). 
ARGUMENT AS TO QUESTION NO. 4 
Petitioner's argument respecting question 4 is contained 
in the above introduction and arguments which are incorporated 
in this part. 
ARGUMENT AS TO QUESTION NO. 5 
Petitioner injected the defense of the statute of 
limitations against the defendant's claim of oral contract 
which was pleaded in defense. The Court of Appeals held 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25 (1988), on which Myers relies, 
only concerns the time within which an action to enforce 
an oral contract may be brought. It does not affect Stout's 
ability to raise the contract in defense to an action brought 
against her. 
If the matter pleaded in defense has the nature and 
character of an independent action and does not constitute 
a pure defense the general rule is that the statute applies. 
54 C.J.S., § 38 Limitations of Action, p. 76. The enforce-
ment of an oral contract has the character of an independent 
action. 
DATED January 23, 1989. 
ROYAL K. HUNT 
PROOF OF MAILING 
Four copies mailed to Carl J. Nemelka, 75 North Center 
American Fork, Utah 84003 on January 23, 1989. 
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ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Third District Court 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOOO 
Marcy G. Myers# 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Darlene Stout, et al., 
Defendants and Respondent. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Publication) 
Case No, 860279-CA 
F I L E D 
Before Judges Billings, Greenwood, and Orme* 
ORME, Judge: UirH CCLT. of Appaats 
Myers appeals from the trial court's judgment quieting 
title to a parcel of real property in Stout, Myers states in 
her brief that the sole issue on appeal is "[w]hether the 
judgment is supported by the facts." We conclude that it is 
and affirm. 
The trial court1s findings of fact and conclusions of law 
in this case are very detailed. Basically, the trial court 
found that Stout purchased the entire parcel of real property 
involved in this dispute pursuant to (1) a uniform real estate 
contract with Al Smith and (2) certain oral representations and 
other actions of Sandra Smith. "To mount a successful attack 
on the trial court's findings of fact, an appellant must 
marshal all the evidence in support of. the trial court's 
findings and then demonstrate that even viewing it in the light 
most favorable to the court below, the evidence is insufficient 
to support the findings." Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 
1070 (Utah 1985). See Harker v. Condominiums Forest Glen, 
Inc.. 740 P.2d 1361, 1362 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Myers has 
failed to marshall the evidence and demonstrate its 
insufficiency and, therefore, we reject her challenge to the 
trial court's findings of fact. Given those findings, the 
trial court's judgment is correct. 
Despite Myers' assertion that the sole issue on appeal is 
whether the judgment is supported by the facts, she attempts to 
raise several other issues in her brief. The argument section 
of Myers* brief consists of five pages, only one of which is 
dedicated to the sole issue on appeal as she identified it. 
The remaining four pages of argument touch briefly on merger, 
the statute of limitations# part performance, and the statute 
of frauds. This discussion is disjointed and otherwise 
difficult to follow. See R. Utah Ct. App. 24(k)(briefs must be 
concise, accurate, and logically arranged). See also 
Demetropoulos v. Vreeken, 754 P.2d 960, 961 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). We likewise need touch upon these legal doctrines only 
briefly. 
We first reject the statute of limitations argument 
offered by Myers. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25 (1988), on which 
Myers relies, only concerns the time within which an action to 
enforce an oral contract may be brought. It does not affect 
Stoutfs ability to raise the contract in defense to an action 
brought against her. 
We reject the part performance and statute of frauds 
arguments, as they axe premised upon a misconstruction of the 
trial courtfs findings. The court held an oral contract 
existed between Sandra Smitn and stout, SAcT fch'kb'TKis ""cStTtrrsrct 
vhlett were madelVi£]r^Hfel51^ tFwhiclTihe 
accepted, endorsed, and cashed. Myers* argument is premised on 
the invalidity of these findings, which has not been shown. 
Finally, we reject the merger argument as that doctrine 
is inapplicable given the trial court's findings. The deed to 
Stout expressly conveys only Al Smith's interest in the 
property and only a contract pertaining to his interest can be 
merged in the deed. The issue in this case involves Sandra 
Smith's interest, which the trial court found passed under a 
contract arising from her actions in participating in the 
negotiation and sale of the property to Stout. There is no 
deed into which a contract concerning Sandra Smith's interest 
can merge. 
The final point we wish to make concerns oral argument. 
Often, an argument which is inartfully advanced in a brief will 
be clarified during oral argument. However, instead of 
following the usual approach to oral argument, Myers' counsel 
ignored the arguments alluded to in her brief and merely gave a 
three-minute dissertation on the doctrine of "departure," 
quoting extensively from a legal encyclopedia. We note that 
"departure" was not raised at trial, in Myers' main brief, or 
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in her reply brief. Especially because her counsel's argument 
did not address any specific pleadings or facts to which we 
might apply the doctrine of "departure,M we give it no 
consideration. 
We find no merit in any issue properly before this court 
and affirm the trial court's judgment. 
Gregory Ki Orme, Judge 
I CONCUR: 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
I CONCUR IN THE RESULT: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
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00O00 
Marcy G. Myers, 
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v. 
Darlene Stout, Et Al# 
Defendant and Respondent-
ORDER DENYING PETITION 
FOR REHEARING 
Case No. 860279-CA 
THIS MATTER havina come before the Court upon Appellant's 
Petition for Rehearing in the above captioned matter# and the Court 
having duly considered said petition/ 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Appellant's Petition for 
Rehearing is denied 
Dated this Lsf day o f December/ 1988. 
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$ & 
Mary Tj/Ndonan 
Clerft-yOf the Court 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
MARCY G. MYERS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DARLENE STOUT, et al., 
Defendants. 
oooOooo 
Trial in the above-entitled matter was heard by the 
Honorable Philip Fishier on the 26th day of March 1986 and 
the 25th day of March 1986. The parties were represented by 
counsel and presented their evidence. Based uoon the testimony 
and evidence received, the court now makes, 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On or about July 1, 1978 Darlene Stout entered into 
a Uniform Real Estate Contract for the purchase of the real 
property in question. 
2. Said contract was between Darlene Stout as purchaser 
and Al Smith dba Al Smith Construction Company as seller. 
3. Al Smith Construction Company was not a corporation 
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. C82 5014 
Judge Fishier 
at the time of the contract, but "Contemporary Home Builders11 
was a corporation with Al Smith and Sandra Smith, his wife, 
as principals. 
4. Prior to the purchase by Darlene Stout the Smiths 
resided in the home in question. 
5. During the summer of 1978 Mrs. Stout discussed the 
sale of the home with Mr. and Mrs. Smith, and both agreed it 
would be sold to Mrs. Stout. 
6. Mrs. Smith acquiesced in the sale and agreed to the 
sale by showing Mrs. Stout through the home and discussing 
the purchase price of $97,500.00. 
7. Mrs. Stout made the down payment and the initial 
monthly payments of $788.00 to Alvin Smith. 
8. Thereafter checks were made payable to Al and Sandra 
Smith which Sandra Smith endorsed and deposited in a joint 
bank account. 
9. Thereafter Mrs. Stout made payments directly to 
Tracy Mortgage on the loan for the property. Said loan was 
in the names of Sandra and Al Smith. 
10. Mrs. Smith never indicated to Mrs. Stout she was pur-
chasing one-half of a home, and knew the payments were for the. 
entire property. 
11. Upon making the down payment, Mrs. Stout took possession 
of the home and had recorded a Notice of Interest referring to the 
contract. 
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12. Thereafter Mrs. Smith attempted to convey an undivided 
one-half interest in the property to Capitol Recovery by way of a 
Warranty Deed dated December 31, 1980. 
13. Capitol Recovery paid no consideration for the interest. 
14. Capitol Recovery attempted to convey an undivided one-half 
interest in the property to Jody Larsen, Inc. aka Jody E. 
Larsen Construction Company, Inc. by Warranty Deed dated January 
27, 1981. 
15. Jody Larsen, Inc. paid no consideraton for the interest. 
16. Jody Larsen, Inc. attempted to convey to Larsen and 
Sons, Inc. its claim to the undivided one-half interest in the 
property by Quitclaim Deed dated September 15, 1981. 
17. Jody Larsen was the president of both Jody Larsen, Inc. 
and Larsen and Sons, Inc. 
18. Larsen & Sons, Inc. had knowledge by and through Jody 
Larsen that no consideration was paid for the claimed interest. 
19. Larsen and Sons, Inc. had knowledge of Mrs. Stout's 
claims to the entire parcel by means of her possession and her 
recorded Notice of Interest. 
20. Jody Larsen individually had the same knowledge and notice 
as Jody Larsen, president of Jody Larsen, Inc. and Jody Larsen. 
president of Larsen and Sons, Inc. 
21. No evidence has been presented to show Larsen and Sons, 
Inc. or Jody Larsen personally gave consideration for the interest. 
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22. Jody Larsen subsequently filed suit for partition of 
the property, 
23. After Larsen filed suit, Darlene Stout recorded a 
Notice of Lis Pendens. 
24. No evidence was presented to show conveyance by 
Larsen & Sons, Inc. to Jody Larsen. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now 
makes and enters its, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Darlene Stout as purchaser and Al Smith dba as Al 
Smith Construction as seller entered a Uniform Real Estate 
Contract for the purchase of the subject real property. 
| 2. Sandra Smith orally agreed to the sale and acquiesced 
I in the sale to Stout and knew the sale was for the entire parcel 
J of property. 
\
3. The checks made to Sandra Smith constitute writings 
referable to her agreement satisfying the Statute of Frauds. 
* 4. Sandra Smith received and accepted benefits from Stout 
\ by means of the checks and payments by Stout upon the loan in the 
\ names of Al and Sandra Smith, and same constitute part performance. 
\
5. Sandra Smith had no interest in the property when she 
warranted an undivided one-half interest to Capitol Recovery. 
6. Defendant's Notice of Interest in a contract for the 
purchase of the property and her possession of the property were 
sufficient to put all subsequent grantees/purchasers on inquiry 
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notice, and her Lis Pendens put all on actual notice of her 
claim to the entire parcel of property, 
7. Plaintiff has not sustained her burden of establishing 
that consideration was given by any purchaser/grantee, in her 
chain of title from Sandra Smith and none are bona fide 
purchasers for value. 
8. Title to the entire parcel of property should be 
quieted in defendant Darlene Stout, 
DATED this ffifray of (V<a*\ . , 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
D i s t r i c t Court Judge 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HINDLEY 
CLERK 
B y
— ' oiauty cierK 
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610 East South Temple,"Suite 2U2 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801)521-5552 
FILED IN CLERKS GFFICF. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
4367 JUN l 0 1986 
H. Dixon Hindley, Qark 3«j Oist Court 
By K LMnmn&_ 
1 Deputy Clork 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
—oooOooo— /$/ £#7 flp . 2 * 3 % 
MARCY G. MYERS, : & -/x 2 ' C -
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
2: j o 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DARLENE STOUT, et al., : Civil No. C 82-5014 
Defendants. : Judge Fishier 
oooOooo 
Defendant's Motion to Introduce Exhibit, for Additional 
Findings of Fact and for Judgment and plaintiff's Motion for 
Judgment and Motion to Re-open Proceedings to Receive Evidence 
were heard by the Honorable Philip Fishier on Monday, Mav 
5, 1986. Upon agreement of counsel, and being fully apprised 
of the matter the court entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and the following Order and Judgment, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 
1) A certified copy of a Quitclaim Decree dated May 
24, 1982, recorded June 7, 1982 at Page 1046 of Book 5380 
in the Salt Lake County Recorders Office in which Larsen & 
Sons, Inc. is grantor and Jody Larsen is grantee be, and 
hereby is admitted into evidence; 
2) A certified en- of the corporate documents of 
Cc ^ ^ ~ > 
Larsen & Sons, Inc. on file with the State of Utah Division 
of Corporations be and hereby is, admitted into evidence; 
3) The court does hereby take judicial notice of the 
Pleadings and Discovery on file herein; and 
4) Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment be and hereby is 
denied and that defendant's Motion for Judgment be and 
hereby is granted. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
defendant Darlene Stout Conple is the sole and exclusive 
owner in fee of the real property more particularly described 
as: 
Lot 23, Glenmoor Country Estates #1, Plat K, 
according to the official plat thereof on file 
in the office of the County Recorder of Salt Lake 
County, Utah. 
and title to the above-described real property is hereby 
quieted in Darlene Stout Copple. The Salt Lake County 
Recorder's office is ordered that the records therein shall 
reflect Darlene Stout Copnle's title thereto. 
DATED this Miday ofQ^L^ 1986 
BY THE COURT: 
Approved as to Form: 
ROYAL K. HUNT 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
PHILIP HISHLI 
Dis tr ic tA Judge ATTEST H. DIXON HINDLEY 
CLERK 
J. NQIELKA 
AttoXtlSjf'ror Defendant 
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